My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent's behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent's prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what they do because their intentional behavior is a matter of luck. The accounts scrutinized include a Kane-type event-causal view, Clarke's account that appeals to both agent causation and event causation in the production of free action, and O'Connor's pure agent-causal account. I conclude by discussing an advantage these libertarian accounts enjoy over compatibilist contenders: they possess a feature necessary to accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
I. INTRODUCTION
ibertarianism is the view that free choice, free action, and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism and that some human beings choose and act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do. Libertarian accounts of free action purport to capture what traditional libertarians regard as crucial for moral responsibility: The agent must be the "ultimate originator" of her conduct-she must, in some respect, be the ultimate source or initiator of her activity-and she must have genuine alternatives at germane junctures along the causal pathway to her behavior. 1 The conceptual adequacy of such libertarian views turns on a variety of factors including whether they can provide adequate accounts L of acting on reasons and of action explanation. In this paper, my primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian contenders seem unable to account for an agent's behavior in a way that reveals a plausible, explanatorily apt connection between the agent's prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. The competitors fail in this respect in a context of special signifi cance to libertarian free choice.
This concern, if legitimate, provides the resources to resolve the following dispute. It has been argued that prominent libertarian views succumb to the so-called "luck objection." In a nutshell, the objection is that if a libertarian agent makes a supposedly free decision, everything prior to the decision might have been exactly the same, and yet the agent could have made an alternative decision instead. What decision the agent actually makes, then, appears to be a matter of luck. This sort of luck seems incompatible with responsibility. 2 Many, opposed to this objection, maintain that the objection falters on its questionable assumption that the libertarian views under scrutiny relent to allegations of luck because libertarian agents exercise less freedom-or responsibility-level control in performing their actions than do deterministic counterparts. 3 However, this assumption, even if suspect, is not vital to the objection. Rather, I argue that it is the inability of the libertarian views to provide a suitable reasons explanation of the libertarian agent's purportedly free decisions that underpins the luck objection.
The paper progresses in this way. I begin with a version of libertarianism according to which the agent's having of prior reasons nondeterministically causes the agent's making of putatively free decisions. 4 Differing from a compatibilist rival only in its requirement of nondeterministic causation in the pathway to action, I show that this version is explanatorily inadequate. Next, I consider Randolph Clarke's account that combines both agent-causation and event-causation in the production of free action, and explain why this account inherits the problems of action explanation that affl ict the former version of libertarianism. 5 I then turn to Timothy O'Connor's "pure" agent-causal view and reveal what I believe is a relevant shortcoming concerning its noncausal account of action explanation. 6 What will emerge is that, however varied in other respects, these libertarian competitors share common features that fuel the problem of action explanation. Finally, despite this problem, I discuss one respect in which these libertarian accounts enjoy an advantage over compatibilist contenders: unlike these contenders, they possess a feature necessary to accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation, right, and wrong. choose or act freely, she must to able to engage in practical reasoning and to guide her behavior in light of the reasons that she has. In addition, like its compatibilist rivals, an event-causal account makes no appeal to metaphysically exotic agents such as Kantian noumenal selves and it avoids forms of causation with relatively steep metaphysical commitments such as agent causation. Further, as with compatibilist competitors, it calls for the decisions or intentions for which an agent is responsible to be the outcomes of causal processes. A free decision or overt action is one that is made for reasons, and its being made for reasons consists, partially, in its being caused in an appropriate and nondeviant way by the agent's having those reasons. The event-causal account differs from compatibilist ones in that it requires that, at some point or points in the causal trajectory to action, the causation among actional events be probabilistic.
A prominent subspecies of event-causal libertarian views, action-centered views, holds that the event in the causal route to an agent's action that is nondeterministically caused is a mental action-typically, the making of a decision. 8 The formula for generating a working version of this sort of libertarianism involves starting with our best compatibilist account of free action (whatever this may be), and then adding to this "host" backbone the requirement that free actions (mental or otherwise) are themselves to be nondeterministically caused. The resulting action-centered libertarianism specifi es that an agent's control, for instance, in making a decision consists in apt agent-involving events nondeviantly and nondeterministically causing that decision. The degree of control exercised by the agent depends on which agent-involving events actually cause the decision and on their etiologies.
The factors that constitute an agent's control in making a decision are the very ones shared by this action-centered view and its compatibilist host: roughly, the decision's being nondeviantly caused by deliberative processes with appropriate causal histories. The sort of control in consideration is proximal (or, alternatively, "active," as Clarke says) control. 9 Such control concerns the direct causal production of agent-involving events, such as the agent's having certain values, desires, and beliefs, his making a certain evaluative judgment, his forming a certain intention or arriving at a certain decision, his executing an intention, and his performing a nonmental action. 10 These broad features of action-centered libertarianism facilitate understanding why many have thought that this species of libertarianism succumbs to a problem of luck. A simple illustration exposes the core of the luck objection. Suppose Peg is mulling over whether to keep a promise to visit Al. She judges that, all things considered, she ought to keep the promise, though reasons of self-interest tempt her to refrain. She decides to keep the promise, and her having certain reasons to do so, including her making the all-things-considered judgment that she ought, on this occasion, to keep the promise, nondeterministically causes her to make this decision. On an action-centered libertarian view, since Peg's decision to keep the promise is nondeterministically caused, there was a chance that her deliberative process would terminate in a decision not to keep the promise. Had Peg made this other decision, it would have been nondeterministically caused by her having reasons of self-interest. Everything prior to the decision that Peg actually makes, including every feature of Peg, might have been just the same, and yet she could have made the alternative decision instead. 11 To underscore this point, consider the nearest possible world with the same past as the past in Peg's world. This world will have a past in which Peg's prior deliberations have resulted in the best judgment that the promise ought to be honored but Peg (or if we want, one of Peg's counterparts, Peg*) decides not to keep the promise. In so deciding, Peg* acquires an intention not to keep the promise. The acquisition of this intention-the making of the decision to refrain from keeping the promise-is seemingly not explained by anything. At least, Peg*'s prior deliberations do not explain why she makes this decision. This is because these deliberations exactly mirror those of Peg's but Peg's deliberations nondeterministically give rise to the opposed decision to keep the promise. As Alfred Mele has commented, if one agent does one thing and another refrains from doing that thing, "and there is nothing about the agents' powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, and the like that explains this difference in outcome, then the difference really just is a matter of luck."
12 Luck of this sort seems incompatible with free action or moral responsibility and it affl icts Peg's situation, it appears, largely but not exclusively because of the availability of genuine alternatives.
It is signifi cant that Clarke interprets partisans of the luck objection as proposing that to the extent that some occurrence is a matter of luck, it is not under anyone's control. The indeterminism in the production of Peg's decision, consequently, according to Clarke's construal of the objectors' position, diminishes the freedom-level control that Peg has in making her decision. 13 Clarke argues that there is no such diminishment and, thus, concludes that the luck objection is not cogent. 14 Robert Kane admits that the indeterminism involved in the causal production of an agent's such as Peg's decision does temper the agent's voluntary control in making the decision. He adds that the indeterminism functions as a hindrance to the agent's purposes that must be overcome by an effort of will. However, he claims that the control-modulating indeterminism stems from the agent's own will-from her desire and effort to do the opposite-and not from any external source. Since the agent's diminished control over each option is due to a confl ict in her own will, Kane proposes that she nonetheless has plural voluntary control over the options considered as a set: she is able to bring about whichever of the options she wills or most wants, when she wills to do so, for the reasons she wills to do so, and without being coerced or compelled in doing so. Having this sort of control, Kane believes, satisfi es the condition that responsibility requires freedom or control. 15 Again, Kane's suggestion seems to be that advocates of the luck objection unwarrantedly assume that luck or indeterministic choice curbs freedom-level control to a measure that the agent is no longer responsible for whichever decision she makes.
I believe that there is a legitimate worry over whether indeterministic choice of the sort in contention does indeed adversely affect responsibility-grounding control. 16 I do not pursue this matter here. Rather, I propose that the luck objection is defensible even assuming that the relevant sort of indeterminsitic choice does not diminish freedom-level control to the extent to which responsibility is threatened. What may well animate the luck objection is a concern over action explanation.
To bring out this concern, let W1 be the actual world in which Peg decides to keep her promise and let W2 be some possible world that does not diverge from W1 until the decision not to keep her promise is made by Peg*. What does Peg* do differently as a result of the doing of which she decides as she does in W2? Of the two alternatives (decide to keep the promise, or to refrain), it is apparently not up to Peg* which of the two is actualized. When Peg* exercises proximal control in deciding as she does, it is the mere chance of deciding differently that distinguishes her from an otherwise identical deterministic counterpart. Given the commitments of action-centered event-causal libertarianism, the past is fi xed. Peg* engages in exactly the same sort of reasoning as does Peg. Yet, she (but not Peg) acts akratically: she supposedly acts freely and intentionally contrary to a consciously held decisive best judgment to keep her promise.
How is her akratic action to be explained? The resources developed by Robert Audi, Mele, and others concerning incontinent action might be thought to be apt. 17 So, for instance, it may be that Peg* selectively focuses on certain elements, downplays expected detrimental long-term effects of letting the promisee down, exaggerates anticipated proximal pleasures of acting self-interestedly, and so forth. Well, then, Peg must have done these very things too. But in W1, Peg did not decide or act akratically despite her being tempted by self-interest in that world. If the past is fi xed, it appears that there is nothing that Peg (the person) did differently in W1 prior to the acquisition of the intention to decide to keep the promise than Peg* did in her world. It appears, consequently, that nothing about Peg*'s deliberations can explain why she, unlike Peg, acquired the intention to decide to break the promise. This is, of course, not to deny that it is metaphysically impossible for Peg* to acquire the intention that she does. A mischievous cosmic elf could have seen to it that Peg* acquires the relevant intention at the relevant time, consistently with W2 not diverging from W1 until the time at which this intention is acquired by Peg*. But such a quirky occurrence is presumably incompatible with Peg*'s acquiring the intention freely. It seems, then, that there is no explanation, in terms of prior reasons, of just what Peg* does in W2 but Peg fails to do in W1 in virtue of which Peg* refrains from keeping the promise in W2 but Peg keeps the promise in W1. In addition, this position can be maintained in tandem with affi rming that Peg* exercises the same degree and kind of proximal control that a deterministic counterpart exercises in making the germane decision, and that Peg's deciding as she does is a matter of freedom-or responsibility-subverting luck. I revert to why such luck is inimical to responsibility shortly. But fi rst, some rejoinders to my position deserve attention.
One might argue that an explanation of Peg*'s self-interested choice is possible if the reasons for which she chooses to make this choice are motivationally much stronger than the reasons she has for making any alternative, even if the self-interested choice is not supported by her best judgment. The explanation appeals to a background principle governing rational choice: "every human agent tends to choose on the basis of the motivationally strongest reasons relevant to the choice at hand." 18 If neither her best judgment nor motivational reasons stronger than the motivational reasons to make the moral decision support Peg*'s self-interested choice, the libertarian need not admit that Peg*'s case is psychologically possible. But even supposing that it were so possible, it is not evident that there is no explanation for the choice. Finally, if it turns out that there is no explanation for the choice, it is nevertheless true that Peg*'s choice has a probabilistic cause, and it is not obvious that moral responsibility ought to be tied to explanatory as opposed to causal notions. 19 I concede that the background principle cited is a plausible candidate for membership in the class of general principles governing the rational explanation of choice. 20 But the concern is that, in the relevant context of allegedly libertarian free choice, this principle, not supplemented by other considerations such as selective focusing, will, it appears, not explain Peg*'s self-interested choice. Again, in brief, the worry is that if Peg*'s choice causally issued from her motivationally stronger reasons, why was this not also true of Peg's choice, given identical pasts? The objector worries that if the scenario under consideration is one in which Peg*'s choice is supported neither by her best judgment nor by her motivationally stronger reasons and yet one in which Peg* makes the self-interested choice, the scenario may not be "psychologically possible." But even if not psychologically possible, it may be coherent. If not coherent nor psychologically possible, then so much the worse for the centered event-causal libertarian, for under contention is the libertarian's view that until Peg makes the moral choice, there is a chance that she could have made an alternative choice under prior identical conditions. Perhaps there is some explanation of Peg*'s choice, but if there is one, the proof is in the pudding. In particular, as previously noted, one would like to know what Peg* does differently as a result of which she, but not Peg, chooses akratically.
Responding to the fi nal concern, both explanatory and causal notions are pertinent to ascriptions of responsibility. A full defense of this claim extends far beyond the purview of this piece. A vital plank in the story, though, should shed light on the centrality of reasons explanation to responsibility. Assume that Peg acts (partly) on the basis of the belief that she ought morally to keep her promise; this belief, in conjunction with other conative and cognitive elements of hers, rationalizes her choice. In the absence of acting in the light of this belief, there are strong reasons for the view that she would not be morally praiseworthy for her choice. 21 Turning, now, to Peg*'s scenario, does Peg*'s choice issue (partly) from this belief or does, for instance, the belief that she is doing moral wrong, suitably fi gure in the causal production of her decision? Without illumination on this point, an appropriate judgment concerning responsibility is not forthcoming.
Turning to a second rejoinder, Kane has proposed that the action-centered libertarian does have the wherewithal to explain the sort of akratic action at issue that is nondeterministically caused. He invites us to ponder an example in which a businesswoman (BW), on the way to a meeting important to her career, observes an assault in an alley. She struggles between deciding to help and her career ambitions that impel her not to miss the meeting. 22 Assume that BW's desire to help is motivationally stronger than her desire to attend the meeting, she judges that it is, all things considered, best for her to help, and she continently makes the decision to help which she then executes. Now consider one of BW's counterparts, BW*, who engages in exactly the same sort of prior reasoning as BW but who nondeterministically makes the decision not to help. On the supposition that BW* subsequently translates this decision into action, BW*'s resulting action is an akratic one. On a popular account of such action, when an agent acts akratically, there is a misalignment between the strength of the desire on which she acts (the motivationally strongest desire) and her better judgment. The stronger motive is opposed to her better judgment. 23 One central problem to account for such action in a case such as BW*'s is that with BW* we see no such misalignment, given a fi xed past. It seems that BW*'s desire to help should mirror, in motivational strength, BW's desire to help. But in the case of BW, this desire is stronger than BW's self-interested desire to advance her career and, further, there is no misalignment between this desire and BW's best judgment to help.
Kane's novel response is that this worry fails to take account of the fact that the misalignment in question does not occur prior to choice but at the moment of choice. The desire to go to the meeting, he suggests, does not become the strongest desire for BW* until she makes it so at the moment of choice. "Akratic misalignment," he writes, "does not preexist the choice; it is created by the akratic agents themselves when they choose." 24 An initial observation is that, in typical cases of akratic action, though the incontinent action is intentionally performed, agents do not intentionally produce akratic misalignment of the sort that is at issue. For example, agents do not typically, at the moment of choice, form all things considered best or better judgments contrary to their motivationally strongest desires that they then have or they do not then acquire desires whose motivational strength is out of line with best or better judgments already made. In any case, if such misalignments do occur at the moment of choice, how do agents produce these misalignments when they choose? Why or how, for instance, does BW* make the desire to go to the meeting strongest at the moment of choice? Presumably, BW* must have done something-performed some action, say, A, or a set of actions-to make this so. Whatever A consists in, what precisely is its causal explanation? One cannot, for example, appeal to the fact that BW*'s selectively focusing on various things resulted in her doing A which, in turn, was the proximal cause of her akratic misalignment. For if BW* engaged in selective focusing prior to her decision not to help the victim, BW must have so engaged as well, given a fi xed past. But we have stipulated that BW did nothing of this sort. Or one might suggest that BW* exerted a preponderate effort of will-a mental action-to go to the meeting which was either identical to BW*'s A-ing or which gave rise to her A-ing. But we are, then, once again saddled with this concern: what does BW* do but BW fail to do, in virtue of which BW*, but not BW, makes the effort of will to go to the meeting rather than the effort of will to help prevail?
There is a general concern with Kane's position on the creation of akratic misalignment at the time of choice: we cannot appeal to any causal elements prior to BW*'s doing A to explain why BW* A-s. This is because prior to doing A (again, whatever A is), BW* does not engage in behavior any different than the behavior in which BW engages, and as our tale is spun, BW does not do A. The only option left, it seems, is to explain BW*'s doing A at the time at which she does A by appealing to actional elements, such as desires and beliefs, that do not obtain or exert their causal infl uence prior to BW*'s A-ing. But what these elements could be is a mystery. It would be no less of a mystery if it were supposed that these actional elements were not acquired prior to BW*'s A-ing but that A was a simultaneous effect of these elements. A plausible account for the acquisition of these elements would have to be advanced but, again, it is unclear what this account could be if the account is, as it presumably would be, a causal one that appeals, in part, to the agent's deliberations.
If there is no discrepancy between the worlds of BW and BW* (or between those of Peg and Peg*) or there are no other relevant dissimilarities to account for the difference in their behavior, then this difference is just a matter of luck. Even though each agent and her pertinent counterpart exercises freedom-level proximal control in deciding as she does and in the subsequent execution of the germane decision, luck of this sort seems to undercut responsibility. Why exactly does it do so? Appraisals of responsibility are fi rst and foremost appraisals of the agent; they disclose the moral worth of an agent with respect, generally, to some episode in her life. For example, when praiseworthy, a person's moral standing or "record" has been enhanced in relation to some germane episode; metaphorically speaking, a positive mark has been entered into her pertinent evaluative ledger. When blameworthy, an agent's standing or record has been blemished; a negative mark has been recorded into her ledger. 25 Assume that BW is praiseworthy for helping the victim. Then the doing of this deed must refl ect positively on her. If nothing in her relevant past-her germane reasoning, for instance-is altered, and she (or her counterpart, BW*) now fails to help, then it seems that failing to help cannot refl ect poorly on her. There is nothing that she has done differently as a result of the doing of which it would be true to the facts that she is now blameworthy or at least that she is not now praiseworthy. Surely, if she were now, for instance, blameworthy for not helping, it would have to be so in virtue of the fact that something about her in relation to her not helping is different-different than what it would have been in relation to her helping. But nothing about her now is relevantly different. It would seem, then, that she is not now blameworthy. Consequently, the initial assumption that BW is praiseworthy for helping need not be granted either.
These refl ections may suggest that libertarian accounts of free action that invoke agent causation might be able to give the agent pride of place. The hope is that by recourse to agent causation, the agent herself (like BW) could make a difference to what decision she makes, assuming unchanging laws and a fi xed past. Let's, then, consider accounts that do appeal to agent causation.
III. CLARKE'S HYBRID VIEW AND LUCK
Clarke admits that a signifi cant difference between action-centered event causal libertarian views and compatibilist views is that the former but not the latter include provisions to ensure that free agents have the chance to act differently. He claims that the mere chance of acting differently, however, does not amount to additional control and, hence, that the presence of such chance does not by itself constitute the agent's acting with a variety of control that her deterministic counterpart lacks.
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He suggests, further, that to have enhanced control in a nondeterministic world, the agent would have to have supplementary power to infl uence causally which of the available "open" actions she will actually perform. On Clarke's estimation, agent-causally producing one's (free) actions supplies this added power. 27 Clarke endorses an event-causal account of action that specifi es that an event is an action only if it is appropriately causally produced by certain conative and cognitive states of the agent. 28 A free action is both nondeterministically caused by apt-agent involving events, such as the agent's prior desires, intentions, and beliefs and co-produced by the agent's substance-causing it. Clarke hypothesizes that, as a matter of nomological necessity, whichever of the open decisions that the agent makes, that decision will be made, and it will be caused by the agent's having the reasons that favor it (together with other mental events) only if the agent substancecauses that decision. Supplementation of the nondeterministic event-causation of the agent's decision, with the substance-causation of it by its agent, secures for the agent the exercise of further positive powers. These powers infl uence causally which of the open alternative courses of action that an event-causal libertarian view permits will become actual. 29 An agent who is, in this way, a co-determinant of her action will, thus, exercise "determining control"-dual directional control-in its production: she will determine which of two or more alternatives become actual. Further, when an agent agent-causes a free action, she herself is an uncaused cause of that action. In this way, she is an ultimate originator of her action and she exercises greater proximal control in its causal production than do either her deterministic or indeterministic counterparts who do not co-generate their actions.
One feature of this intriguing hybrid view merits preliminary comment. In his recent book, Clarke claims that an agent's exercise of direct active control in agentcausing an action is not itself an action. 30 Later in the book, though, he remarks that an agent's exercise of causal power, when she acts with direct freedom, is "just her bringing about that action, her standing in a relation of causation to it, her causing it."
31 But the agent's exercising, at a time, an ability to determine which action she performs then-her exercising of causal power or direct freedom-does seem to be an action. If it is not an action, it is puzzling what sort of thing it could be. 32 If it is an action, however, then it seems that there would have to be an exception to the proposal endorsed by Clarke that an event is an action only if it is appropriately caused by prior cognitive or conative states. For the action in question-the agent's exercise of direct freedom, her substance-causing something-it has been argued, can have no cause. 33 If this, in turn, is true, the correct explanation of this action, if there is one, will be a noncausal one. Clarke, however, is dubious about the adequacy of any such account of action explanation. On Clarke's own commitments to what a satisfactory action explanation consists in, hence, there can be no action explanation of the action at issue.
Clarke does explain that if agent, S, agent caused a decision, D, it follows logically from the fact that S caused D that the complex event, S's agent causing D, occurred. He adds that, in exercising the agent causal powers to produce D, the agent infl uenced by the exercise of these very same powers whether the complex event (C) of his causing D would occur. 34 It is open to Clarke to claim that what we are assuming is an action, complex event C, does have an "indirect" explanation: whatever explains S's causing D explains C as well. But there would still be a puzzle about whether C is free and, hence, about whether its agent can be morally responsible for bringing it about, and whether the decision that is the (simultaneous) salient effect of this complex event is indirectly free, its freedom deriving from the freedom of C. For a vital postulate of the hybrid theory is that a free action is both nondeterministically caused by its agent's prior reasons and agent-caused by its agent. The sticking point is that it seems that C is not agent-caused by its agent, S; it is logically entailed by S's agent-causing D.
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Barring these concerns, despite its invocation of agent-causation, the hybrid theory, it seems, cannot circumvent the problem of luck. Clarke argues that causal theories of action have a distinct advantage over noncausal ones in giving an account of acting for reasons and in explaining rational actions. Indeed, a factor strongly impelling Clarke to the view that free actions are both agent-caused and nondeterministically event-caused by the agent's prior reasons is that, in his assessment, "pure" agent-causal views cannot successfully account for the timing and rational explicability of human actions. The event-causal component of the hybrid view assumes the burden of action explanation: on this view, we can explain what an agent did or why she did something at a certain time by citing relevant events, such as the agent's prior reasons, in the event-causal chain leading to her action. Noting that an agent is also the cause of her free action, Clarke affi rms, indicates a further cause of that action, and it indicates that a necessary condition of the agent's acting with a variety of enhanced control is met. But Clarke admits that it is "unclear whether noting this contributes to an explanation of the action." 36 One's agent-causing one's action does not help answer why one performed that action; "the reasons explanation that cites event-causes of the action does that." 37 Our previous discussion of BW's predicament revealed that there was no difference between the worlds of BW and BW* to account for the discrepancy in their behavior. The disparity in behavior, thus, seemed to be just a matter of responsibility-subverting luck. If the event-causal component of the hybrid view shoulders the burden of action explanation, then it would seem that this view could not account for the difference in behavior either. It could not do so because in the BW/BW* scenarios, the event-causal components of conduct-for instance, the agents' having of reasons for doing what they did-are held constant.
Against this skeptical verdict, one might insist that the hybrid view does have the means to account for the difference in action: if BW freely decides to help, she does so only if she agent-causes her decision to help; similarly, if BW* decides not to help, she so decides only if she agent-causes this decision. These dissimilarities, however, do nothing to dispel the fundamental riddle. For, surely, the pertinent question requiring response that is left unanswered by conceding these dissimilarities is this: if the past is fi xed, there is nothing that BW did differently in her world prior to agent-causing her decision to help the victim than BW* did in her world prior to her agent-causing her decision not to help. Why, then, did BW* agent-cause what she did, and in so doing acted akratically, when BW agent-caused something quite different, and in so doing acted continently? If unadulterated action-centered libertarianism generates a puzzle regarding BW*'s forming an intention to do one thing when her pertinent counterpart forms an intention to do something distinctly different (given a fi xed past), why does a similar concern not reemerge in association with the assumed agent-causal activity of these counterparts?
IV. TIM O'CONNOR'S AGENT-CAUSAL ACCOUNT, ACTION EXPLANATION, AND LUCK
O'Connor, unconvinced by Clarke's hybrid theory, develops a more traditional libertarian position insofar as it specifi es that free actions are not, as Clarke proposes, co-caused but are solely agent-caused. 38 A second notable difference is that O'Connor's view of free action is wedded to a noncausal account of action explanation. According to O'Connor, a directly free action is an agent's causing a certain event, rather than an event that is agent-caused. He offers the following as suffi cient conditions for a reasons explanation in terms of an antecedent desire. An agent has acted on some occasion in order to satisfy his antecedent desire that q, if:
1. prior to this action, the agent had a desire that q and believed that by so acting he would satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire;
2. the agent's action was initiated (in part) by his own self-determining causal activity, the event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-actiontriggering-intention-to-so-act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-q;
3. concurrent with this action, he continued to desire that q and intended of this action that it satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; and 4. the concurrent intention was a direct causal consequence (intuitively, a continuation) of the action-triggering intention brought about by the agent, and it causally sustained the completion of the action. 39 This view has it that the immediate effect of a person's agent-causal activity is an action-triggering state of intention that endures throughout the action and guides its completion. Part of the intention's content is that its agent act here and now in a particular sort of way. Another of its crucial elements is that an action of a specifi c sort be performed for certain reasons that the agent had at that time. It is the intention's referring to the guiding reason that is the basis of the explanatory link between what is immediately agent-caused and the agent's prior reasons. As O'Connor explains, had the agent generated a different intention, "it would have been done (in most cases) for a different reason, to which reason the content of the intention itself would have referred." 40 Suppose, then, that Patsy has two reasons to draw the curtains. She wants to admire the breathtaking view from her room (and believes that she will be able to do so if she draws the curtains) and she wants to let in some light as well. Suppose she acts for the former reason. Causalists will claim that it is this reason, a component of which is the apt desire, and not the other that causes Patsy's relevant intention. On O'Connor's noncausal account, Patsy agentcauses an intention to satisfy the desire to admire the view; she does not form an intention to satisfy the desire to let some light into the room.
I proceed by supposing (what some do not concede) that this noncausal account succeeds in providing suffi cient conditions to explain why an agent acted as he did. 41 My principal aim is to examine whether the account enables O'Connor to evade the luck objection. Reverting to Peg's case, again assume that there is no misalignment between Peg's evaluative judgment that it is best for her to keep the promise to visit Al and the motivational strength of the desire to keep that promise. This desire, we suppose, is stronger than her opposed concurrent one to break the promise. We also assume that in her world, Peg freely decides to keep her promise-her decision is agent-caused-and that her subsequent action is freely performed. In contrast, holding the past fi xed, in her world, Peg* freely and intentionally breaks the promise-she acts akratically.
Appealing to O'Connor's noncausal account of action explanation, it might be suggested that we could straightforwardly explain Peg*'s action by replacing, in each of its pertinent occurrences in summary 1-4, "q" with "the desire to keep the promise to visit Al," "agent" with "Peg*," and "action" with "visiting Al." Similarly, it could be proposed that summary 1-4 provides us with suffi cient conditions to account for Peg's keeping her promise. In short, Peg agent-causes an intention to satisfy her desire to keep her promise whereas Peg* agent-causes an intention to satisfy her desire to do something else. But even if all of this is granted, we are left without an explanation of what it is that Peg* does in her world, W2, that Peg fails to do in W1, in virtue of which Peg* refrains from keeping the promise in W2 but Peg keeps her promise in W1. If the past is fi xed, Peg*'s agent-causing an intention to break her promise-this action-appears to be out of line both with her best judgment to keep the promise and her motivationally stronger desire to keep the promise. The concern here is brought to light by refl ecting on O'Connor's proposal regarding how reasons infl uence agent-causal activity. O'Connor writes:
[R]ecognizing a reason to act induces or elevates an objective propensity of the agent to initiate the behavior. . . . [M]y reasons structure my activity . . . in the more fi ne-grained manner of giving me, qua active cause, relative tendencies to act. These are tendencies that it remains entirely up to me to act on or not; what I do is not simply the consequence of the vagaries of "chancelike" indeterministic activity such as may be true of quantum phenomena. 42 Refi ne Peg's case by supposing that Peg is the sort of person who is highly disposed to act in accordance with her best judgments. She recognizes that she has good reason to keep her promise and this recognition raises her propensity to keep her promise more so than it does her propensity to break her promise. Suppose, in addition, that Peg does not change her mind about what she judges it is best for her to do in her situation, or that she does not lose the desire to keep her promise altogether. 43 Assuming that the past is fi xed, Peg*'s (pertinent) motivational profi le mirrors that of Peg. But then there is a worrisome disconnection between Peg*'s prior reasons to keep the promise, on the one hand, and her agent-causal activity to break the promise, on the other. If Peg*'s relevant psychological profi le parallels that of Peg, then Peg*'s recognition of her prior reasons should have increased her tendency, qua active cause, to keep her promise. She has (just like Peg) judged it better, all things considered, to keep her promise than to do otherwise, and the motivational strength of her desire to keep the promise is aligned with this evaluative judgment regarding what it is best for her to do in her situation. Further, she does not engage in prolonged deliberation, lose completely the desire to keep the promise or otherwise change her mind, selectively focus on the immediate payoffs of breaking the promise, and so forth. Still, she akratically breaks her promise. Despite its being the case that Peg*'s breaking her promise is an event that is intrinsically an action, one exemplifying an exercise of control in virtue of being agent-caused, 44 with no accounting of why she acts akratically, this action seems to be a matter of responsibility-undermining luck.
V. LIBERTARIANISM AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A UNIFIED THEORY
Two questions naturally arise: First, is there a viable version of libertarianism that gives libertarians all they want and that does not succumb to the luck objection? 45 Second, if there is no such version, what, if anything, is of value in the kinds of libertarian theory that we have canvassed? I shall not even speculate on an answer to the fi rst question. But I do have something to offer in response to the second.
Judgments of moral responsibility that are, in large measure, judgments about moral praise-or blameworthiness should not be confl ated with so-called "morally deontic judgments" that are judgments about moral right, wrong, and obligation.
Many but not all libertarians, unlike many but not all compatibilists, believe that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of responsibility-they affi rm that no person, for instance, can be blameworthy for performing an action unless she could have done otherwise. Preoccupied, perhaps, with responsibility, libertarians have generally ignored or not recognized the view that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of morally deontic judgments. Standard principles of moral obligation support such a requirement.
One principle, accepted by several compatibilists, incompatibilists, consequentialists, and deontologists of all stripes, is the principle that "ought" implies "can" (principle K). A correlate of K is that if it is (overall and not just prima facie) obligatory for one to refrain from performing an action, then one can refrain from performing that action. Another stock deontic principle (principle OW) says that it is (overall) obligatory for one to do something if and only if it is (overall) wrong for one to refrain from doing it. An implicate of this principle is that if it is wrong for one to perform some action, then it is obligatory for one to refrain from performing that action. This implicate, together with the correlate of K that "ought not" implies "can avoid," generates the conclusion that if it is morally wrong for one to perform an action, then one can refrain from performing it.
If K is true, and "ought" does imply "can," then "right" and "wrong" imply "can" as well. Another implicate of OW is that if it is obligatory for one to refrain from doing something, then it is wrong for one to do that thing. This implicate, in conjunction with the principle that "wrong" implies "can," yields the result that if it is morally obligatory for one to refrain from doing something, then one can do that thing. Hence, "obligation," too, just like "wrong," implies "can refrain."
Finally, in the absence of compelling reason to believe otherwise, it would be implausible to suppose that if "obligation" and "wrong" both imply "can refrain," "right," does not also do so. It follows that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for "right," "wrong," and "obligation." 46 It is not my intention to defend this roughly hewn line of reasoning here, for I have done so elsewhere. 47 Nor am I under any pretense that what I have offered in its defense will convince everyone. Rather, I direct attention to the fact that if the argument is accepted, a pressing concern arises if it is also accepted that determinism rules out alternative possibilities and is, thus, incompatible with obligation, right, and wrong. The concern is that customary compatibilist theories of free action cannot accommodate, or cannot be modifi ed to accommodate, the truth of morally deontic judgments. A theory that will accommodate such judgments will, hence, be libertarian in that it will provide for agents having genuine alternative possibilities. But there is a stumbling block: will we not then just as surely run up against the old nemesis again? If the sort of luck that infects a libertarian account of free action subverts judgments of moral responsibility, will such an account not also subvert judgments of moral obligation?
The question is a pressing one. But there is hope that it can be answered in a somewhat reassuring fashion. This is because unlike judgments of responsibility that reveal something about the moral worth of an agent (usually) in connection with some episode in her life, and are, in this manner, "agent-focused," morally deontic judgments are "act-focused." Deontic appraisals turn principally on conditions that the act itself must satisfy. Now it might be disputed that morally deontic appraisals are act-rather than agent-focused. For though we say things like "Peg* did what was wrong," and this appraisal seems to be act-focused, we also say things like "Peg* was wrong to do what she did," and this appraisal seems to be agent-focused. But it is, fi rst, unclear whether when we say such things as "Peg* was wrong to do what she did," and we intend by such an utterance to express negative appraisal of the act but not of the agent, what we say is a somewhat inaccurate way of conveying that what Peg* did was wrong. Second, we can readily agree that it can be the case that, though Peg* did wrong (or right), she was not blame-or praiseworthy for what she did. It can also be the case that an agent can be blame-or praiseworthy for doing something that is not wrong (or right). 48 A negative evaluation of the act need reveal no fault on the part of the agent and, analogously, a negative appraisal of the agent need imply nothing about whether the pertinent act merits a negative morally deontic assessment.
If morally deontic judgments are primarily act-focused, then there are doubts whether the kind of luck associated with the complement of libertarian views previously outlined will undermine deontic appraisals. For consider, fi rst, unintentional wrongdoing brought about in this sort of way: Aiming at the basket, I throw the ball. But it is defl ected by a sudden, powerful gust of wind and, as a result, it smashes into and destroys the prized orchid. The incident is, surely, luck-infected in a transparent sense and yet the judgment that my throwing the ball was wrong seems quite proper. Consider, second, the Peg/Peg* scenario. Suppose Peg has kept her promise and now, with the past fi xed, Peg* akratically breaks the promise. Suppose, further, that Peg* exercises proximal control in breaking her promise. Again, it does not seem that there is anything untoward in the judgment that she does wrong in breaking the promise, though this action of hers is luck-infused. There seems to be, then, an asymmetry of sorts between judgments of responsibility and those of obligation, right, and wrong. Luck of the kind in question undermines the former but not the latter.
One might not be convinced by this simple illustration. An objection can be developed along the following lines. In the case of throwing the ball and destroying the orchid, the destroying of the orchid is unintentional. This is presumably why we can consider exonerating the agent from responsibility even though destroying the orchid may have been wrong. Furthermore, we can imagine variations on the example where the agent might be thought responsible even if he did not intend to destroy the orchid. If he knew it was windy, or others had warned him of the danger, and he went ahead and threw the ball anyway, he could be blamed for negligence. So agent responsibility (along with wrongness of acts) is not entirely off the table or beyond application in cases of this sort where the agent does not intend the outcome even when luck is involved.
But, if this is so, diffi culties arise when we turn to the Peg example. Peg intentionally keeps her promise and Peg* intentionally breaks it, though the outcomes in each case are luck or chance infested. Relating this back to the orchid example, this would be more like an agent intentionally trying to destroy the orchid by throwing the ball at it, while knowing that he might not succeed because the wind was gusting and the outcome was therefore uncertain and chance infested. If in such circumstances he did succeed and the ball destroyed the orchid despite the wind, it seems we could hold the agent responsible as well as maintaining that the act was wrong. The fact that he might have failed by chance does not undermine his responsibility or the wrongness of his act. Hence, the asymmetry argued for-that luck is consistent with morally deontic judgments of acts but not with judgments of responsibility-does not generally hold. 49 The concession that Peg's moral act and the ball-thrower's negligent act have primary moral deontic statuses is welcome. Whether, though, Peg is morally praiseworthy for her act and the ball-thrower morally blameworthy for his depends on further specifi cations of the scenarios.
I have not denied that causal contrastive explanations are possible for putatively free choices not determined by prior events. So there may well be such an explanation for the ball-thrower's chance-infused negligent act, and if so, the arguments of the prior four sections of this paper will not undermine the judgment that the ball-thrower is responsible. I see little reason, then, not to accept the view that one could be responsible for intentionally trying to do something, even though the pertinent outcome was chance-infused. However, if the ball-thrower's scenario duplicates, in relevant respects, Peg's scenario, then, as previously explained, there is no motivation to accept the judgment that the ball-thrower is morally blameworthy for destroying the orchid.
I believe that the asymmetry advanced concerning responsibility and right, wrong, and obligation is crucially associated with the following. Judgments of moral praise-or blameworthiness bear on the agent's moral standing-they refl ect negatively or positively on the agent herself. It is reasonable to expect something different in the agent-perhaps something different in how she perceives the situation and thus in her moral beliefs-if she is to be blameworthy under otherwise type-identical circumstances in which her relevant counterpart is assumed to be praiseworthy. In contrast, deontic appraisals of obligation or wrong are associated more with, roughly, the agent-external world. Given a suitably fl exible construal of "best," many people subscribe to the view that one ought, morally, to do the best one can. Fleshed out, the view is that one ought to do an act A if and only if one can do A, one can refrain from doing A, and any accessible world in which one does not do A is deontically inferior to some accessible world in which one does A. 50 Once again, suppose Peg* akratically breaks her promise and she exercises proximal control in performing this action. (In her libertarian world, she could have kept her promise and, had she done so, she would have exercised proximal control in keeping her promise.) Assume that any world accessible to Peg* in which Peg* does not keep her promise is deontically inferior to some accessible world in which Peg* keeps her promise. Then her akratically breaking the promise, even though luck infused, seems wrong. How good or bad deontically the world is, may well be affected by the actions of Peg* even though Peg*'s performance of these actions could be luck infused. The status of Peg*'s moral standing in relation to various episodes in her life, in contrast, cannot be affected by the sort of luck at issue in any way other than that this sort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.
To draw some ends together, if there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of morally deontic judgments, and "libertarian luck" of the sort in consideration leaves unaffected such judgments, then a libertarian account of free action may well be hospitable to such judgments (setting aside, of course, the deep worry of action explanation). Such an account will, in this respect, have an edge over a compatibilist competitor. But there is a disheartening downside to our inquiries. Let's say that a unifying theory of free action, if there is one, is a theory that accommodates both moral responsibility and moral obligation. A typical compatibilist account is not a unifying theory because it cannot accommodate moral obligation. A stock libertarian account does not meet the requirements of a unifying theory either because it cannot accommodate moral responsibility. Thus it seems that the prospects for a unifying theory are grim.
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